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Double standards: the verdicts of western election
observers in sub-Saharan Africa
Susan Dodsworth
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, UK
ABSTRACT
This article tests whether Western election observers apply a “double standard” to
elections in sub-Saharan Africa. It demonstrates that they do: Western election
observers were statistically less likely to allege that signiﬁcant fraud had occurred in
an election in sub-Saharan Africa, than an election of the same quality held
elsewhere, throughout the period from 1991 to 2012. This discrepancy exists despite
controls for other factors commonly thought to inﬂuence the verdicts of observers,
such as the strategic interests of Western countries. Yet, there is variation over time.
Between 1991 and 2001, the double standard is partly explained by “progress bias,”
a tendency to tolerate ﬂawed elections that improved on those held previously.
From 2002 to 2012, observers’ application of a double standard is much harder to
explain. In that period, the analysis points to several factors that discourage Western
observers from alleging fraud, including the risk of triggering electoral violence and
a desire to protect relationships with strategic partners. It also identiﬁes factors that
make allegations of electoral fraud more likely, including the precedent set by past
allegations of fraud and – unexpectedly – higher levels of foreign aid. None of these
factors, however, account for the regional discrepancy.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 16 July 2018; Accepted 28 September 2018
KEYWORDS election observation; election monitoring; electoral integrity; sub-Saharan Africa; democracy
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International election observers not only aim to detect and deter fraud, but to increase
the credibility of elections. This is increasingly diﬃcult in sub-Saharan Africa due to
allegations that observers are biased, applying lower standards to elections in that
region than they do to elections elsewhere. In 2017, Kenya’s presidential election
brought this issue to the fore. After international observers cautiously endorsed the
poll, Kenya’s Supreme Court invalidated it on constitutional grounds, ruling that the
election process was neither suﬃciently transparent nor veriﬁable.1 Though the
Court did not allege that fraud had taken place, the verdict was highly embarrassing
for international observations and called their credibility into doubt.2
While the belief that observers accept lower quality elections in sub-Saharan Africa
appears widespread, there is surprisingly little research that examines its empirical
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foundations. Nic Cheeseman and Brian Klaas calculate that between 1989 and 2012,
Western groups were 4% less likely to allege that fraud had occurred when they observed
an election in Africa.3 However, their calculation is based on how frequently fraud is
alleged in diﬀerent regions, without controlling for potential underlying sources of bias.
This article goes further, testing whetherWestern election observers accept lower standards
in sub-SaharanAfrica, evenwhenwe control for other factors commonly thought to bias the
verdicts of these groups. It focuses on Western observers because they ought to have the
highest standards; if anyone is applying a double standard to African elections, it is them.
Drawing primarily on data from the National Elections Across Democracy and
Autocracy (NELDA) dataset,4 this article uses logistic regression to analyse all elections
observed by Western groups between 1991 and 2012. It ﬁnds that a double standard
does exist; Western election observers are less likely to allege that signiﬁcant fraud
has occurred in an election in sub-Saharan Africa, than an election of the same
quality held elsewhere. This eﬀect is signiﬁcant and substantial, even when controlling
for factors – such as foreign aid, democratic progress, risk of electoral violence, and stra-
tegic importance – commonly thought to bias the verdicts of observers.
In the ﬁrst half of the period analysed, part of the double standard can be explained by
what Judith Kelley termed “progress bias”5 – Western election observers tend to tolerate
ﬂawed elections when they represent an improvement on the past. From 2002 onwards,
the double standard not only persists but is more diﬃcult to explain. There is strong evidence
that the risk of triggering election violence discourages observers frommaking allegations of
fraud in this period, and less robust evidence that the desire to protect relationships with
strategic military allies has a similar eﬀect. These factors do not, however, account for the
regional discrepancy. Other factors commonly proﬀered as explanations for bias in election
observation – including natural resource wealth – lack any signiﬁcant eﬀect or – in the case
of foreign aid – have the opposite eﬀect to what was anticipated.
The importance of credibility and known sources of bias
Election observation is the observation of an election by an independent party in order
to assess the conduct of that election on the basis of national legislation and international
election standards. International election observation, which occurs only at the invitation
of national governments, is deﬁned by who carries it out: typically, non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) such as the Carter Center, National Democratic Institute (NDI),
International Republication Institute (IRI) and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable
Democracy in Africa (EISA), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the
European Union (EU), the Commonwealth, the Organization for Security and Co-oper-
ation in Europe (OSCE) and the South African Development Community (SADC).
Although most international observers subscribe to a common set of standards, the meth-
odologies they apply varies. Generally, an observation mission launched by one of these
organizations comprises a small team of long-term observers and a larger team of short-
term observers. The latter are normally tasked with observing the campaign and analysing
the broader political context in which it takes place, while the former focus on the casting
and counting of ballots on election day.
For decades, international election observation has been “the best-established, most
visible, and often best-funded type of democracy-related assistance.”6 It aims to improve
the quality of elections and to increase public trust in the electoral process. However, the
ability of international observers to achieve the latter of these goals depends on their
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credibility because it inﬂuences the impact of their verdicts on individual’s perceptions of
electoral quality.7 Perceptions of bias therefore pose a real threat to their eﬀectiveness.
Despite this, the history of allegations of bias in election observation is as long as the
history of election observation itself, with a disproportionate number of critics citing
elections in sub-Saharan Africa as evidence.8 Such allegations fuel a widely-shared belief
that election observers apply lower standards to elections in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet
there may simply be more fraudulent elections in the region, and so more opportunities
for observers to “miss” electoral fraud. Alternatively, the apparent double standard
might be the product of underlying causes, rather than something that is distinct about
the region. That is, the region might simply be a proxy for other types of bias.
In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the tendency of international observers to “pull
their punches” has long been attributed to a desire, on the part of Western donors, to
protect development programmes from disruption.9 Some recount stories of Western
aid oﬃcials pressuring observers to tone down their reports lest they trigger aid suspen-
sions or reductions.10 The strategic interests of Western countries might also play a role.
A desire to maintain good relationships with governments that control critical natural
resources, are valuable allies in the war on terror, or play an important role in peace-
keeping are commonly cited as explanations when observers appear to overlook elec-
toral fraud.11 For example, Western observers’ apparent reluctance to call out
electoral manipulation in Uganda is often attributed to the important role it plays in
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).12
The apparent regional double standard might also be explained by a tendency to
forgive ﬂawed elections providing that there is evidence of progress towards democracy
more generally. International observers are notorious for excusing poor-quality elections
in sub-Saharan Africa on the basis that they represent “a step in the right direction.”
Indeed, critics have described that phrase as “one of the most worn-out metaphors in
the ﬁeld” and “an eﬀort in self-delusion,”13 though it may simply be a convenient
excuse, rather than the true reason why electoral deﬁciencies are tolerated.14A desire to
minimize electoral violence might also help to explain the behaviour of Western election
observers in sub-Saharan Africa. Existing work suggests that a fear of causing, or exacer-
bating, electoral violence tends to encourage observers to tone down their criticism, lest
accusations of fraud trigger protests by the opposition or repression by the incumbent.15
This bias might be stronger in sub-Saharan Africa, either because international observers
have made the maintenance of peace a higher priority there, or because electoral violence
is (or is assumed to be) more common in the region.
Judith Kelley labels these diﬀerent forms of bias, respectively, as “special relationship
bias”, “progress bias” and “stability bias.”16 She also provides empirical evidence demon-
strating their inﬂuence on the likelihood that international observers will approve (or
condemn) an election. Any, or all, of these could explain the apparent double standard
that is applied in sub-Saharan Africa. Perversely, Western observers may actually be
more vulnerable to these sources of bias than other international observers. Western gov-
ernments and IGOs with Western members are the largest providers of foreign aid and
are more likely to come under political pressure to suspend aid if the democratic creden-
tials of recipients are in doubt. They constitute the audience most strongly motivated to
incentivise democratic reforms by rewarding progress and are particularly keen to avoid
the costs (human and economic) of electoral violence.
This vulnerability to bias is paradoxical because perceptions of partiality are more
damaging to Western election observers; they are expected to have higher standards.
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Western countries played a central role in institutionalizing the norm that elections
should be monitored by international actors.17 This implies that Western observers
should be more sensitive to electoral fraud. To some extent, they are: IGOs with
highly democratic members are less likely to endorse the elections they observe.18
Thus if Western election observers apply a regional double standard, it is particularly
perplexing, and something that we need to understand.
In seeking to do this, we should be alert to the possibility of change over time. The
practice of international election observation has evolved over the last few decades. One
important shift has been professionalization. This has taken several forms, including the
training of observers and the codiﬁcation of standards to which they must adhere.
Observers have made these changes partly in response criticism, including the com-
plaint that elections observers lacked credibility because they were not impartial.19
The context in which observation takes place has also shifted in relevant ways. In the
1990s, a signiﬁcant number of countries, including many African states, were making
clear progress towards democracy. By 2014 analysts looking back on the previous 15
years observed “neither substantial gains nor substantial losses” in democratization.20
Thus, “progress bias” might explain the apparent regional double standard in the
past, but not the present. This possibility will therefore need to be accommodated in
the empirical analysis, to which this article now turns.
Research design
To test whether Western election observers apply lower standards to elections in sub-
Saharan Africa than those held elsewhere this article draws on a global dataset of 633
national legislative and/or executive elections. This covers all elections at which
Western observers were present from 1991 to 2012. This dataset has been compiled
from several sources, with NELDA providing the foundation.21 The unit of analysis
is the election. However, where NELDA codes concurrent legislative and executive elec-
tions (i.e. those held on the same day) separately, the dataset used here collapses those
elections into a single observation and omits Constituent Assembly elections.
Key variables
In the analyses presented below, the outcome of interest is the verdict of Western elec-
tion observers, ALLEGE FRAUD (based on NELDA47). This is captured as a dummy
variable, coded 1 if Western election observers alleged that signiﬁcant fraud occurred in
an election, and 0 if they did not.22 NELDA deﬁnes “Western” election observers as
those from Western countries (identiﬁed by OECD membership) or Western inter-
national organizations but, unfortunately, does not provide an explicit list of which
organizations its coders included within this category. Elections held in sub-Saharan
Africa are identiﬁed by SS.AFRICA, a dummy variable, coded 1 if an election was
held in sub-Saharan Africa, and 0 if it was held elsewhere.
The variable ELECTIONQUALITY is the Clean Election Index from the Varieties of
Democracy dataset (V-Dem).23 This index measures the extent to which an election was
free and fair. It varies from 0 to 1, with higher scores denoting better quality elections.
The index aggregates 8 indicator variables, coded by V-Dem country experts. These
measure: (i) the autonomy of the electoral management body; (ii) its capacity; (iii)
the accuracy of the voter registry; (iv) the extent of vote-buying; (v) the presence of
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other voting irregularities (such as ballot stuﬃng or intentional absence of voting
materials) or electoral fraud; (vi) whether opposition candidates, parties or campaign
workers were subjected to government intimidation; (vii) the presence (or absence)
of other types of electoral violence (i.e. violence not committed by the government,
ruling party or their agents); and, (viii) whether the election was generally considered
(by country experts) to be free and fair.
Observers might be less critical of electoral ﬂaws when they occur in political systems
that are, on the whole, more democratic. To control for this, the models below use the
V-Dem index of ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY. This index measures electoral democ-
racy, understood broadly as polyarchy: a political system whose core value of making
rulers responsive to citizens is achieved though electoral competition in a context
where suﬀrage is extensive, political and civil society organizations can operate freely,
elections are free of fraud or systematic irregularities, there is freedom of expression,
and there is a capable and independent media.24
Observers might tolerate lower standards in poorer countries, including many
countries in sub-Saharan Arica, on the basis that they cannot aﬀord high quality elec-
tions. Expectations here, however, are not entirely clear. Some developing countries
spend far more on elections (per voter) than established democracies,25 with costs con-
tinuing to rise as donors and governments embrace new technologies designed to
improve election quality.26 Keeping this in mind, the models presented below control
for GDP PER CAPITA. This is measured in current US dollars, logged and lagged by
one year, with data sourced from the World Bank.27
The impact of potential disruption to aid programmes is controlled using FOREIGN
AID. This measures foreign aid as the log of net oﬃcial development assistance and
oﬃcial aid, in current US dollars, in the year prior to the election. Data are sourced
from the World Bank.28 Total, rather than per capita, ﬁgures are used as – theoretically
– what matters is the importance of the aid ﬂows to donors, rather than the importance
of that aid to recipient governments.
The strategic interests of Western countries are controlled for with two variables.
One is MILITARY AID. This is the log of (US military aid + 1)29, in the year prior to
the election, measured in constant US dollars. Data are sourced from USAID’s database,
U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, informally known as “the Greenbook.” Though US
strategic interests are not necessarily synonymous with those of other Western
countries, the US is undoubtedly the most inﬂuential Western country. Moreover,
several of the most prominent international NGOs that engage in election observation
– IRI, NDI and the Carter Center – as based in the US, while the US is a key player in
several of the regional IGOs that engage in election observation, including the OSCE
and the Organization of American States. US military aid is therefore a useful proxy
for Western strategic interests in the context of this article.
The second measure of strategic interest is NATURAL RESOURCES. This is the log
of the value of a country’s natural resource rents, measured in the year before the elec-
tion. It has been calculated using World Bank data on natural resource rents (compris-
ing rents from oil, gas, minerals, coal and forests).30 NATURAL RESOURCES are
measured by reference to their total value, rather than as a proportion of GDP, since
what matters (for the purposes of this article) is the relative importance of those
natural resources to Western countries.
To control for the possibility of “progress bias”, the analyses below use two diﬀerent
variables. One – PROGRESS: DEMOCRACY – measures improvements in democracy
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over the three years preceding an election. This is measured using the V-DEM measure
of electoral democracy, describe above. Measuring changes in the level of democracy
over a three-year period allows adequate time for change to occur, but also ensures
those changes occur in suﬃcient proximity to an election that they are likely to
inﬂuence the behaviour of observers.
Western observers might be more sensitive to improvements in election quality,
rather than progress in democratization more broadly. To control for this, some
models include PROGRESS: ELECTION QUALITY. This is the diﬀerence between
ELECTION QUALITY for a given election and ELECTION QUALITY for the election
that preceded it. As was the case for the other measures of progress, this has been cal-
culated so that positive scores correspond to improvements. In contrast, however, to the
other progress variables, this measure is not calculated over a ﬁxed time period because
the temporal lag depends on the length of the electoral cycle in each country.
To control for what Kelley terms “stability bias,”31 we need a variable that captures
the risk that an allegation of signiﬁcant fraud will trigger electoral violence. Since past
experience is likely to aﬀect present risk, I use PAST: RIOT/PROTEST. This is based on
NELDA30 (for the previous election) which identiﬁes cases in which riots or protests
occurred after an election and were linked to complaints of fraud (but not necessarily
allegations by observers). PAST: RIOT/PROTEST is coded 1 where the previous election
was followed by riots or protests related to allegations of fraud, and 0 where no riots or
protests occurred, or where they occurred but were not linked to allegations of fraud. In
case Western observers are more sensitive to the risk of triggering electoral violence in
sub-Saharan Africa, some models also include an interaction term (SS.AFRICA*PAST:
RIOT/PROTEST) to capture this.
Finally, verdicts ofWestern election observers might be inﬂuenced by precedent. Having
made an allegation of fraud with respect to a country’s elections in the past, they may be
more likely to do so again. To control for this possibility, I use PAST: FRAUD
ALLEGED. This is based on NELDA47 (for the previous election). It is coded 1 if
Western observers alleged that signiﬁcant fraud took place in the previous election, and
0 if they did not, or were not present. Table 1 provides a descriptive summary of variables.
Potential selection bias
International election observers only provide verdicts on elections at which they are in
fact present. Therefore, the dataset used in this article only includes those elections at
Table 1. Summary of variables.
Variables Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
ALLEGE FRAUD 633 0.223 0.416 0 1
ELECTION QUALITY 626 0.542 0.258 0.050 0.981
SS.AFRICA 626 0.310 0.463 0 1
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY 623 0.495 0.216 0.087 0.911
FOREIGN AID (LOG) 560 19.429 1.178 15.634 22.908
GDP PER CAPITA (LOG) 614 7.350 1.326 4.789 11.186
NATURAL RESOURCES (LOG) 602 19.823 2.346 12.467 26.608
MILITARY AID (LOG) 633 11.391 6.530 0 22.667
PAST: RIOT/PROTEST 611 0.167 0.373 0 1
PAST: FRAUD ALLEGED 611 0.182 0.386 0 1
PROGRESS: DEMOCRACY 615 0.038 0.114 −0.355 0.663
PROGRESS: ELECTION QUALITY 604 0.022 0.117 −0.354 0.960
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which this was the case. Although the emergence of a norm that elections ought to be
observed means that international monitors are present at a much higher proportion of
elections than in the past, international election observation is still not universal.32
Moreover, the presence (or absence) of election observers is not random; they must
be invited by incumbent governments. Where an invitation is issued, it may be declined
if observers fear their presence will only legitimate the re-election of an authoritarian
regime. This means Western observers are less likely to be present when elections are
highly likely to be rigged – either because they have chosen not to attend, or because
they were not invited. This generates selection bias.
In other studies, researchers have solved this problem with statistical techniques
including instruments, propensity score matching and matching using “genetic” algor-
ithms.33 These techniques have some utility where the problem is more properly
described as endogeneity than selection bias. That is, when the outcome of interest is
something that can occur regardless of whether or not an election is observed, such
as changes in the quality of governance,34 opposition boycotts,35 or variation in the
competitiveness of elections.36 These techniques are less useful when the relevant
outcome – Western election observers making a declaration of fraud – can occur
only if they are present at an election. Thus, while Kelley uses genetic matching to
account for endogeneity in her examination of the impact of international observation
on opposition boycotts,37 she does not do so in her analysis of the diﬀerent types of bias
that inﬂuence the verdicts of those observers.38
As an (admittedly imperfect) alternative to matching, the analyses in this article
exclude the period prior to 1991. This helps to reduce selection bias because the
late 1980s witnessed a dramatic expansion in international election observation, trans-
forming it from an exception to the rule.39 Thus, there should be less “selection” in
the presence or absence of Western observers in the period from 1991 onwards.
Indeed, this fact has led others to use the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989
as an instrument for their presence.40 However, this approach cannot entirely elim-
inate selection bias.
There is, unfortunately, little empirical evidence about what determines which elec-
tions are observed by international monitors. The limited evidence that does exist
suggests that Western observers are more likely to be present at elections held in
countries that receive large amounts of aid.41 This may prevent us from accurately cap-
turing the inﬂuence of foreign aid, particularly given that major recipients of develop-
ment aid are more likely to be found in sub-Saharan Africa. Other variables, such as
progress towards democracy, might also inﬂuence which elections are observed by
Western groups, but on the face of it, seem less likely to vary systematically between
sub-Saharan Africa and other regions. These possibilities must be kept in mind when
interpreting results.
Endogeneity
There is an inescapable degree of endogeneity in the analyses presented below. This
arises because there is a subjective element to ELECTION QUALITY (and the indi-
cators it aggregates), which is based on the perceptions of country experts rather
than a completely “objective” set of indicators.42 Since that coding has been done retro-
spectively by V-DEM country experts, whether or not Western observers made alle-
gations of fraud could have aﬀected country experts’ assessments of electoral quality.
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This is not, however, a fatal problem. ALLEGE FRAUD, which is taken from
NELDA, is a dichotomous dummy variable that has been coded based on a range of
sources, including US State Department Library of Congress Country Reports and
newspaper reports.43 As such, it captures only the “headline” verdict of Western obser-
vers. It does not necessarily reﬂect the more detailed information that is typically
included in the full reports of election observers. V-DEM’s country-experts can be
expected to have looked beyond observers’ headline verdicts to the detail of their
reports in coding the 8 indicators that ELECTION QUALITY aggregates. With the
potential exception of the indicator which captures whether an election was generally
regarded as being free and fair, all of the indicators on which ELECTION QUALITY
is based demand more nuanced analysis than can be found in headline verdicts. An
analysis of the relationship between ALLEGE FRAUD and ELECTION QUALITY
reinforces this point. The latter is in fact a relatively poor predictor of the former: V-
Dem country experts frequently assign low scores for election quality in the absence
of any allegation of signiﬁcant fraud from Western observers, though they rarely
assign high scores when a fraud allegation has been made.
This endogeneity cannot be avoided through statistical techniques, so it must be fac-
tored in to how results are interpreted. To the extent that Western election observers’
verdicts aﬀect country experts’ assessments of electoral quality, it should make electoral
quality a stronger and more reliable predictor of observers’ verdicts. From a statistical
point of view, this would make it even more remarkable if the analysis nevertheless
reveals a bias linked to the geographic location of elections. Endogeneity between
ALLEGE FRAUD and ELECTION QUALITY should make this harder, not easier to
demonstrate.
Empirical results
To test whether Western election observers apply a diﬀerent standard to elections held
in sub-Saharan Africa, I use a logistic regression, where ALLEGE FRAUD is the depen-
dent variable. In addition to controlling for any regional eﬀect, using SS.AFRICA, I
include controls for other factors, discussed above, that are likely to inﬂuence the behav-
iour of observers. All of the models below use robust standard errors clustered on
countries.
Table 2 shows the results of three models, across three diﬀerent time periods: 1991–
2012, 1991–2001 and 2002–2012. Together, these provide strong evidence that Western
election observers apply lower standards to elections held in sub-Saharan Africa than to
elections held elsewhere. In every model, the co-eﬃcient for SS.AFRICA is negative,
indicating that Western observers are less likely to alleged that signiﬁcant election
fraud has occurred when an election takes place in sub-Saharan Africa, even when
the quality of the election (and other control variables) is held constant. The regional
variable is clearly signiﬁcant across all time periods, though it is less strongly signiﬁcant
in the earlier period, from 1991 to 2001 (i.e. Models 4–6).
The coeﬃcients of a logistic regression provide little insight into the substantive
eﬀect of variables (beyond direction). However, using Stata’s margins command to
calculate predicted probabilities based on the models in Table 2 reveals that the sub-
stantive eﬀect of SS.AFRICA is quite large. If an election scores 0.3 for ELECTION
QUALITY, and that country is in sub-Saharan Africa, the probability that Western
election monitors will allege that serious electoral fraud has taken place is about 21%
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Table 2. Allegations of signiﬁcant election fraud by Western observers.
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
1991–2012 1991–2012 1991–2012 1991–2001 1991–2001 1991–2001 2002–2012 2002–2012 2002–2012
ELECTION QUALITY −7.269***
(−1.295)
−6.442***
(−1.311)
−6.433***
(−1.297)
−7.208***
(−1.737)
−6.084***
(−1.699)
−6.330***
(−1.707)
−8.422***
(−1.765)
−7.720***
(−1.699)
−7.739***
(−1.673)
SS.AFRICA −1.548***
(−0.377)
−1.421***
(−0.369)
−1.256***
(−0.381)
−1.361**
(−0.495)
−1.262*
(−0.494)
−1.011†
(−0.521)
−2.248***
(−0.534)
−2.128***
(−0.526)
−2.160***
(−0.623)
ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY 0.965
(−1.530)
−0.00394
(−1.477)
0.0468
(−1.451)
2.688
(−1.900)
1.449
(−1.811)
1.672
(−1.864)
−0.672
(−2.142)
−1.744
(−2.008)
−1.761
(−2.050)
FOREIGN AID (LOG) 0.227
(−0.144)
0.218
(−0.144)
0.222
(−0.145)
−0.056
(−0.215)
−0.0758
(−0.220)
−0.0808
(−0.223)
0.621*
(−0.251)
0.619*
(−0.258)
0.620*
(−0.259)
GDP PER CAPITA (LOG) −0.0522
(−0.172)
−0.0135
(−0.169)
−0.00947
(−0.169)
−0.0804
(−0.229)
−0.072
(−0.222)
−0.0409
(−0.223)
−0.0427
(−0.266)
0.0129
(−0.278)
0.0142
(−0.277)
NATURAL RESOURCES (LOG) 0.120†
(−0.0646)
0.115†
(−0.063)
0.116†
(−0.0632)
0.103
(−0.0873)
0.0943
(−0.0887)
0.097
(−0.0878)
0.14
(−0.092)
0.144
(−0.0946)
0.144
(−0.0938)
MILITARY AID (LOG) −0.0301
(−0.0254)
−0.0188
(−0.0252)
−0.0177
(−0.0249)
−0.0213
(−0.0307)
−0.00915
(−0.0287)
−0.0087
(−0.0282)
−0.0826*
(−0.036)
−0.0773*
(−0.0357)
−0.0778*
(−0.0368)
PAST: RIOT/PROTEST −0.838*
(−0.362)
−0.824*
(−0.374)
−0.515
(−0.516)
−0.124
(−0.513)
0.00329
(−0.543)
0.601
(−0.705)
−1.703**
(−0.622)
−1.778**
(−0.625)
−1.825*
(−0.834)
PAST: FRAUD ALLEGED 1.109***
(−0.263)
1.322***
(−0.270)
1.354***
(−0.272)
0.337
(−0.384)
0.596
(−0.384)
0.636
(−0.391)
1.637***
(−0.389)
1.772***
(−0.382)
1.767***
(−0.373)
PROGRESS: DEMOCRACY −3.331*
(−1.602)
−1.051
(−1.584)
−0.934
(−1.599)
−1.986
(−1.629)
−0.0279
(−1.554)
−0.0233
(−1.586)
−8.495*
(−3.451)
−5.987
(−3.747)
−6.04
(−3.805)
PROGRESS: ELECTION QUALITY −5.216**
(−1.653)
−5.380***
(−1.628)
−5.075**
(−1.933)
−5.057**
(−1.934)
−5.994*
(−2.770)
−5.939*
(−2.864)
SS.AFRICA*PAST: RIOT/PROTEST −0.842
(−0.773)
−1.678†
(−0.917)
0.127
(−1.178)
constant −4.153
(−2.981)
−4.37
(−3.003)
−4.599
(−3.071)
1.032
(−4.746)
1.267
(−4.789)
1.013
(−4.986)
−10.42†
(−5.360)
−10.87*
(−5.437)
−10.84*
(−5.430)
N 524 524 524 247 247 247 277 277 277
Wald chi2 116.8 112.6 120.0 53.57 52.90 54.96 67.79 74.35 74.30
Probability > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pseudo R2 0.335 0.352 0.354 0.232 0.254 0.263 0.479 0.492 0.493
Log pseudolikelihood −191.565 −186.613 −185.931 −101.489 −98.608 −97.421 −81.072 −78.915 −78.908
Notes: Logistic regression. Robust standard errors, clustered on countries, are in parentheses.
†p≤ 0.1; *p≤ 0.05; **p≤ 0.01; ***p≤ 0.001.
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(based on Model 2 in Table 2).44 In other regions this probability more than doubles,
to 47%.
The discrepancy in the probability of Western monitors making allegations of sig-
niﬁcant electoral fraud in Sub-Saharan Africa, compared to other regions, lessens
once the conﬁdence levels on these predicted probabilities are taken into account. In
the years from 1991 to 2001, the gap eﬀectively disappears. Yet – as illustrated in
Figure 1 – in the later period, a gap remains when ELECTION QUALITY suggests
the election process was questionable but not blatantly fraudulent.
Returning to the results in Table 2, we ﬁnd evidence to suggest that the apparent
application of a regional double standard by Western election observers is partly
explained by “progress bias”, but only between 1991 and 2001. As Model 1 shows, pro-
gress in terms of electoral democracy, broadly understood, reduces the likelihood that
Western observers will make allegations of signiﬁcant fraud, holding other variables
(including the quality of the election) constant. In a country where the level of electoral
democracy increases by 0.1 in the three years prior to an election, the probability that
Western observers will make an allegation of fraud is about 21% (based on Model 1). In
a country where the level of electoral democracy has deteriorated by the same amount,
that probability is 29%.
However, the diﬀerences between Models 1 and 2 (and Models 7 and 8), suggest that
Western observers are more strongly inﬂuenced by improvements in the quality of
Figure 1. Impact of region on the probability that Western observers allege signiﬁcant fraud.
Note: Based on models 2, 5 and 8 in Table 2, with 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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elections speciﬁcally, rather than improvements in democracy more broadly. The more
targeted measure of progress is signiﬁcant across all time periods analysed and its
inclusion (in Models 2 and 8) suppresses the signiﬁcance of the broader measure of
improvements in democratic quality. The substantive eﬀect of progress in election
quality is also notable. In a country that has improved the quality of its elections by
0.1, Western observers are roughly half as likely to make an allegation of fraud than
if the quality of the election process had declined by the same amount.
The models presented in Table 2 provide strong evidence that the risk of triggering
electoral violence discourages Western observers from calling out electoral fraud when
they see it. The variable PAST: RIOT/PROTESTS, which indicates whether the previous
election was followed by riots or protests related to allegations of fraud, is statistically
signiﬁcant in Models 1 and 2, as well as Models 7, 8 and 9. Its eﬀect appears to be stron-
gest between 2002 and 2012, when it is more strongly signiﬁcant and has a large sub-
stantive eﬀect. If the previous election was followed by riots or protests linked to
complaints of fraud, the probability that Western observers will make an allegation
of fraud is on average 13 percentage points lower than if this is not the case (based
on Model 8).
There is some evidence that Western observers are particularly sensitive to the risk of
triggering election violence in sub-Saharan Africa, and that this plays a role in explain-
ing why they are less likely to allege that fraud has occurred in that region. However,
that evidence is quite weak. Introducing the interaction term SS.AFRICA*PAST:
RIOT/PROTEST in Model 3 results in PAST: RIOT/PROTEST losing signiﬁcance
(compared to Model 2), but the interaction term itself is not signiﬁcant. The interaction
term approaches signiﬁcance in Model 6, where its p-value is 0.067, and supresses the
signiﬁcance of the regional dummy. Notably, this model is the only one where the sig-
niﬁcance of the regional dummy falls below the 95% threshold, albeit not by much (the
relevant p-value is 0.052).
There is strong evidence that past experience shapes the behaviour of Western elec-
tion observers, though as is the case with concerns about the triggering electoral violence,
this variable appears to play a role primarily in more recent years. Past experience of alle-
ging fraud, captured by PAST: FRAUD ALLEGED, is positively and very signiﬁcantly
related to Western observers’ allegations of fraud both when the entire period from
1991 to 2012 is analysed (Models 1–3) and when only the latter half of that period is
analysed (Models 7–9). Thus, Western observers are more likely to allege that fraud
has occurred when they made such an allegation regarding the previous election. The
size of the eﬀect varies. For an election held in sub-Saharan Africa, a previous allegation
of fraud increases the probability that Western election observers will make a similar
allegation with respect to the current election from just over 11% to 25%. For elections
held elsewhere, this probability shifts from 26% to almost 45% (based on Model 2).
This result suggests a degree of path-dependency in Western observers’ application
of a regional double standard; having failed to call out election fraud in sub-Saharan
Africa in the past, they are less likely to do so in the future. In contrast, having set
the precedent of pointing out serious electoral fraud when they see it elsewhere, they
are more likely to do so in the future. This raises the question of whether there is some-
thing about the practices of Western election observers that helps to perpetuate the
regional double standard, a question that this article returns to in the ﬁnal section.
The results in Model 7–9 suggest that the strategic interests of Western governments,
measured through US military aid, do inﬂuence the verdicts of Western election
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observers, but do not account for the regional double standard. The variable MILITARY
AID is signiﬁcant at the 95% level in all three of these models, making allegations of
signiﬁcant electoral fraud less likely. The substantive eﬀect, however, is not large. In
a country with a MILITARY AID “score” of 12.5 (equivalent to the receipt of
roughly $270,000 in military aid) the probability that Western election observers will
make an allegation of signiﬁcant fraud is almost 22%. Increasing the MILITARY
AID score to 18.5 (approximately $100 million) raises that probability only slightly,
to just under 26%. Once conﬁdence intervals are factored in, the gap between the pre-
dicted probabilities disappears. Notably, diagnostic checks (discussed below) suggest
that this result in less robust than others. This may, however, be due to the diﬃculty
of capturing strategic interests rather than their irrelevance.
The second measure of strategic interest, natural resource wealth, does not have the
expected eﬀect. It is signiﬁcant in Models 1–3 only if the threshold is dropped to 90%,
with the sign of the co-eﬃcients indicating a positive rather than a negative eﬀect on the
probability of a fraud allegation. This result could indicate a lack of measurement val-
idity, stemming from the fact that the measure of natural resource wealth does not
capture whether the primary customers for those natural resources are (or are not)
Western states.
Foreign aid also has an eﬀect, but one that is counter to expectations, in the period
from 2002 to 2012. Here it is signiﬁcant at the 95% level and has a positive eﬀect on the
probability that Western observers will allege that electoral fraud has occurred. In a
country that received $100 million in foreign aid in the year prior to the election, the
probability that Western observers will make an allegation of fraud is about 18%. If
foreign aid rises to $800 million, that ﬁgure is about 28%. Though this result is
counter to expectations, it should be noted that Kelley’s earlier ﬁnding with respect
to foreign aid was one of her less robust, a result she described as potentially
“tenuous.” 45 Perhaps more importantly, Kelley’s ﬁnding was based on data that did
not cover years after 2004. This article’s divergent ﬁnding with respect foreign aid
might therefore reﬂect change over time. For example, it could be the product of
pressure on donors to apply higher standards or shifts in aid modalities, including
the declining use of general budget support as a result of its political vulnerability
when high proﬁle breaches of democratic practice or human rights standards occur.
Robustness of results
Replicating the models in Table 2 using a probit regression produces extremely similar
results, both in terms of goodness-of-ﬁt and in terms of the signiﬁcance of independent
variables. The results presented above are also robust to checks for particularly deviant
cases. Diagnostic tests identify two deviant cases – Macedonia’s presidential election in
2004 and India’s general election in 1996. Neither case, however, exerts much inﬂuence
on the results. In contrast, a handful of cases, while not deviant, provide a large amount
of the leverage with respect to one result: the role of MILITARY AID in Models 7–9.
The signiﬁcance of that variable is driven by Egypt’s elections in 2012, Armenia’s pre-
sidential election in 2008, and Rwanda’s presidential election of 2003. If these cases are
removed, then MILITARY AID loses signiﬁcance in Models 7–9.
The less robust nature of the ﬁnding with respect to MILITARY AID may indicate it
does a poor job of capturing Western government’s strategic interests. Here, another
check is useful. Since sub-Saharan Africa may not be the only region in which
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Western election observers apply a double standard, I re-ran the models in Table 2
several times, substituting a dummy variable for a diﬀerent region in each iteration.
Those models suggest that a double standard also exists with respect to two other
regions: post-communist/former Soviet countries, and Asia. In those regions,
Western observers are more, rather than less, likely to allege that signiﬁcant electoral
fraud has occurred. This could be interpreted as a sign that Western observers are
more willing to call out electoral fraud in elections where the primary regional power
is not only a geo-political rival, but an authoritarian state. In such contexts, fraudulent
elections might be perceived as a more direct threat to Western interests. Thus, the stra-
tegic interests of Western governments may have more inﬂuence than the results in
Table 2 suggest.
Other results are more robust to the inclusion of additional or alternative control
variables. The stakes are higher in Presidential elections, so observers might be more
sensitive to fraud in such cases. Yet including an indicator, EXECUTIVE (coded 1 if
the election included an executive race) has no eﬀect on results and the indicator
itself is not signiﬁcant in any of the models. Western observers may be less likely to
allege that fraud has occurred when incumbents lose power. However, adding INCUM-
BENT LOSES (coded 1 if the incumbent party loses and 0 if not) suggests this is not the
case; it is not statistically signiﬁcant in any of the time periods tested. It does
decrease the signiﬁcance of MILITARY AID in Models 7–9 but closer inspection
reveals that this is the product of a change in the sample being analysed (as a result
of missing values).46
Since Western election observers might be more strongly inﬂuenced by aid from
Western donors, I constructed an alternative measure of FOREIGN AID that only
includes ﬂows from such sources.47 This more focussed measure of foreign aid is signiﬁ-
cant at the 99% level in Models 7–9, which analyse the period from 2002 to 2012.
Notably, the sign of the co-eﬃcient stays positive. This adds weight to the ﬁnding
that the prevailing view (that Western observers are reluctant to allege fraud lest it
disrupt development programmes) is wrong. However, since aid ﬂows may inﬂuence
which election are observed, this result might also be the product of selection bias.
Further research would be required to determine which of these is the case.
Using a more targeted measure of strategic importance, ENERGY RESOURCES, in
place of NATURAL RESOURCES produces similar results, with two exceptions. First,
the signiﬁcance of the more targeted measure is slightly higher in some models. Second,
its inclusion supresses the signiﬁcance of improvements in election quality in the period
from 2002 to 2012; it retains signiﬁcance only at the 90% level. I also examined the
impact of natural resources if foreign aid is not controlled, as missing values for
FOREIGN AID may be artiﬁcially reducing variation in NATURAL RESOURCES
(as cases with high resource wealth – and thus no aid – are dropped). If FOREIGN
AID is omitted, NATURAL RESOURCES becomes signiﬁcant at the 99% level,
across Models 1–3 and 7–9 (other results remain largely unchanged). As in Table 2,
and counter to expectations, it has a positive sign, suggesting that Western observers
are more likely to allege that signiﬁcant fraud has occurred in countries with greater
natural resource wealth. It seems highly likely that some degree of selection bias is at
play here: Western observers may avoid (or simply not be invited to) elections in
countries rich in natural resources where they anticipate signiﬁcant diplomatic pressure
to give fraudulent elections a “free pass.” In others, such as the major oil producing
nations in the Gulf, there may simply be no elections to observe.
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The ﬁndings regarding “progress bias” are robust to changes in the time over which
progress is measured. Where progress is measured over a shorter time-frame (2 years)
the results are almost identical. If progress is measured over a longer time-frame (4 or 5
years) there is some variation; the relevant variables are more strongly signiﬁcant in the
earlier time period (i.e. in the equivalents of Model 4) but less so in the later period (the
equivalents of Model 7).
In one set of alternative models, I replaced the measure of democratic progress based
on V-Dem’s data with a measure of improvement in the Polity2 score from PolityIV.48
This produced very similar results. In contrast to the result in Table 2, this alternative
measure of progress was not signiﬁcant in the equivalent of Model 7 but was very
strongly signiﬁcant (at the 99.9% level) in Model 4, in which the regional dummy
lost signiﬁcance (becoming signiﬁcant only at the 90% level). Measuring progress
with data from Freedom House produced an almost identical result; while progress
in respect for civil liberties had no eﬀect, progress in respect for political results was
very strongly signiﬁcant in Model 4 and reduced the signiﬁcance of the regional
dummy. These diﬀerences probably stem from the fact that these measures of demo-
cratic progress are slightly more focussed.
The practice of election observation and the problem of perceptions
This article has shown that Western observers are less likely to allege that signiﬁcant
fraud has occurred in an election held in sub-Saharan Africa, than in an election of
the same quality held elsewhere, even when potential underlying drivers of that
double standard are controlled. In the period before 2002, this discrepancy is partly
explained by “progress bias”. Western observers were willing to overlook ﬂawed elec-
tions when countries had nevertheless improved the quality of their election process.
From 2002 onwards, the double standard is both more distinct and more diﬃcult to
explain. There is strong evidence that the willingness of Western observers to make alle-
gations of fraud is decreased by the risk of triggering electoral violence and increased by
having alleged fraud in the previous election. There is weaker evidence that a desire to
protect relationships with strategic military allies has a similar eﬀect, discouraging alle-
gations of fraud in the period between 2002 and 2012. Yet, these factors are not enough
to explain the apparent regional bias in that period.
It is not entirely surprising to ﬁnd evidence that a double standard does exist. What is
unexpected is how persistent this regional discrepancy is in the period from 2002
onwards. The contemporary practice of election observation is by no means perfect,
but in recent years, many international observers have professionalized their operations
and adopted reforms designed to improve the accuracy and impartiality of their work.49
One would hope, given these changes, that the verdicts of Western observers have
become less biased, rather than more.
There are at least two possible explanations for why the regional double standard has
become more, rather than less, pronounced over time. One is that electoral fraud may
have taken on distinct regional “ﬂavours”, some of which may be more diﬃcult to detect
or more diﬃcult to condemn. Vote-buying, for example, appears to have become a
more common practice in elections in sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere.50 This prac-
tice is arguably harder to condemn than other forms of electoral manipulation, particu-
larly when the amounts involved are (to Western eyes) relatively small, and when their
payment is legitimized by local norms.51
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A second possible explanation is that the tendency of Western election observers to
apply lower standards to elections in sub-Saharan Africa is now driven by perceptions
of that region, rather than countries’ objective characteristics. For example, Western
election observers might believe that African elections involve much higher risks of
post-election violence than is the case. This explanation was not directly tested in
this article, but it deserves further examination in future research. If the problem is per-
ceptions, then there is a risk that the professionalization of election observation has
played a role in both entrenching and perpetuating the double standard. Indeed,
there is potentially some support for this in the analysis present above. As noted
earlier, there appears to be a degree of path-dependency in the behaviour of Western
election observers; they are far more likely to make an allegation of electoral fraud if
they did so in the previous election. This may indicate that observers come to expect,
and thus accept, a certain level of electoral quality in a given country, with organiz-
ational practices – such as training – perpetuating these expectations over time.
The limitations of existing data place constraints on the analysis in this article, but
create promising avenues for future research. Relying on NELDA means treating
Western election observers as a homogenous group while also lumping all “non-
Western” observers together.52 It is highly likely that the behaviour of diﬀerent
Western election observers, as well as diﬀerent non-Western observers, varies system-
atically. Though organizations like the EU and Carter Center adopt a broadly similar
approach to election observation, there may be important diﬀerences in the precise
methodologies they apply, the extent of the resources that they allocate to an election,
and their deﬁnitions of electoral fraud. African observers might behave diﬀerently to
those from Latin America. Western observers may also respond diﬀerently to African
elections depending on whether they are from international NGOs or IGOs. Indeed,
we know that international NGOs – Western and non-Western – are less likely to
endorse an election than IGOs.53
This article is also limited in that it only examines the behaviour of Western obser-
vers with respect to allegations of signiﬁcant electoral fraud. This is not the only thing
that can undermine the quality of an election. So too can malpractice or maladminis-
tration (which lack the crucial element of intent), as can systemic manipulation (for
example, of electoral boundaries) that occurs well before an election campaign
begins.54 Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this article to examine how such prac-
tices – and the responses of international observers to them – might vary between
regions.
These issues warrant further attention in future work, as does the question of why
the regional double standard persists despite attempts to improve the accuracy and
credibility of election observation in more recent years. It is imperative that we under-
stand what drives the regional double standard because it fosters allegations of hypoc-
risy and prejudice against international observers. This, in turn, undermines the ability
of observers to achieve their ultimate goal; elections that not only meet democratic stan-
dards, but are are accepted as credible and legitimate by the people who vote in them.
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